I Introduction
This paper documents the anomaly of the Chinese warrant market that has been developed since August 2005. We find that the market prices of warrants are generally much higher systematically than the Black-Scholes prices and provide evidence that warrants in China in these embryo years could not be effectively replicated by the underlying assets and hence were unlikely to be an effective hedging tool. Therefore, while carrying the same name, warrants in China markets can hardly be viewed as a conventional option-like derivative. The success of the market must be attributed to the possibility that it met economic needs other than hedging and risk management. Particularly, we examine the extent to which the China warrant and underlying prices conform to the one-dimensional diffusion model, study the cumulated gains of a delta-hedged warrant portfolio, and conduct investigation into what economic variables may account for these negative delta-hedging gains. We contribute to the literature by offering a systematic empirical study of the most active warrant derivative market worldwide, which also happens to be the youngest of its kind. This is of no surprise as, in the absence of a short-sale mechanism, arbitrage trading in this market is essentially impossible. The evidence reinforces this fundamental intuition and offers a useful reference to regulatory agencies of other emerging financial markets.
The literature on studying the Chinese warrant market is scarce. Xiong and Yu (2011) observe bubbles in the market by focusing on put warrants in [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] . They also use the data to test bubble theories and show evidence of the experimental bubble. Wu (2011) further studies the Chinese warrants bubble by using both put and call warrants in [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] . He finds that the bubble size is related to turnover, daily price change, and the total number of warrants outstanding.
Powers, Xiao, and Yan (2009) use adjusted Black-Scholes model, jump-diffusion model and constant elasticity of variance model to examine pricing errors in the Chinese warrants. They argue that unique settlement rule is an important factor for the mispricing in the warrants and investors were willing to pay a premium for put warrants to get a convenience yield.
The methodology of our main empirical tests was proposed and used by Bakshi, Cao and Chen (2000) in which they examine whether or not the one-dimensional diffusion model applies in the S&P 500 index options market. The one-dimensional diffusion model is also known as the local (deterministic) volatility model and was independently developed by Derman and Kani (1994a, b) , Dupire (1994), and Rubinstein (1994) . An important implication of one-dimensional diffusion models is that the derivative price depends only on the prices of its underlying assets.
Examples of one-dimensional diffusion models include the classical Black and Scholes (1973) , Merton (1973) , and the Cox and Ross (1976) constant elasticity of variance (CEV) model. Bakshi, Cao and Chen (2000) argue that any one-dimensional diffusion model must satisfy three properties: monotonicity, perfect correlation and redundancy between warrant and its underlying prices. If the prices of a warrant market systematically violate any of the three properties, one may conclude that the one-dimensional diffusion model does not apply in this market. Following the idea, we first test whether the China warrant prices follow the Black-Scholes formula with historical volatility. We then perform comprehensive tests on the monotonic, perfect correlation and redundant relationships between the warrant and the underlying prices for all 30 available expired warrants. We find that the market prices of warrants are much higher systematically than the Black-Scholes prices with historical volatility and document ample evidence that the one-dimensional diffusion model does not apply well in the Chinese warrant market.
Further, we study the cumulated gains of a delta-hedged warrant portfolio by following Bakshi and Kapadia (2003a, b) . We find that the cumulated gains are negative for 27 out of 30 expired warrants. While Bakshi and Kapadia (2003a) also document a negative average delta-hedging gain in the S&P 500 options market, the magnitude of the average gains in the Chinese warrant market is a few hundred times larger than those reported in the U.S. market. The extremely poor hedging performance further confirms the inapplicability conclusion of the one-dimensional diffusion model tests. Moreover, we conduct investigation into what economic variables may account for these daily delta-hedging gains. The regression results suggest that the negative gains are significantly related to the market index return volatility, the underlying stock return volatility, the daily trading value of warrants (for puts), and the market risk (for calls). If trading volume is a proper yardstick, then the record speaks for itself that the development of the China warrant market has been a huge success. Therefore, while failing to be an effective hedging tool, one must admit that these financial assets have met some other important economic demand. One such possibility is the speculative demand. As up to now, equity trading on margin of any form is still prohibited in China. Derivatives enable investors to trade on information that otherwise might be prohibitively expensive to trade on. Call warrants, for example, have characteristics similar to levered positions in the underlying asset. They allow investors to assume the same risk of the underlying asset with a relatively small investment. Likewise, with put warrants, investors can more easily take advantage of negative information about the underlying assets when faced with short-sale constraints. We suspect that facilitating trades on either positive or negative information in a relatively cheap manner could have contributed to the large demand.
If it is so, the availability of these new financial instruments might somewhat has enhanced the completeness of the China financial markets.
The overwhelmingly large trading volume and turnover render a systematic study on the Chinese warrant market an important task in its own right. However, what is more important for such a study is that China launched the warrant market at a time when short-sales of any financial assets were not allowed in the markets. The lack of such a crucial mechanism makes a low-cost perfect replication of derivatives by other financial assets impossible. As a result, no risk-free arbitrage force arguably exists to exploit any possible mis-alignment between the prices of the warrants and the underlying assets, rendering the possibility that warrants are priced by mechanisms other than those suggested by conventional derivative theories.
However, when a huge speculative demand is present and a cheap risk-free arbitrage mechanism is absent, one still could not entirely eliminate the possibility that the huge trading volume and the extraordinary price volatility exhibited in some trades are simply a manifestation of the resale option theory of bubbles. This idea was first proposed by Harrison and Kreps (1978) and recently applied to the China warrant market by Xiong and Yu (2011) . We also observed that some very deep out-of-the-money warrants were created by qualified issuers with a hardly justifiable price and were actively traded by retail investors. Indeed, there were incidents in which securities firms made significant profits by selling "zero value" put warrants to retail investors.
The evident is consistent with the claim that a speculative bubble to some extent existed in this embryo market. Perhaps undercurrent forces, market completion enhancement and speculative frenzy have played a role in creating the phenomenal trading volume. This should be an interesting future research issue. It is clear from this study that warrants in general are not redundant assets in the China capital markets as evidence shows that the conditions of the one-dimensional diffusion model were frequently violated and the investors were trading some other risks in addition to the underlying risk.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section II introduces the history and current situation of the Chinese warrant market. Section III describes the data. Section IV presents empirical results. Section V concludes the paper.
II Warrant and the Chinese warrant market 2.1.Warrants Warrants are the call or put options written by the issuer of underlying securities or by a third party, entitling their holders to purchase (call) or sell (put) the underlying securities from or to the issuer, or collect the price difference by cash settlement, at a predetermined price at any time during a specified period or on a specified expiry date. Hereinafter, unless otherwise specified, warrant refers to call warrant. Warrants can be divided into two categories based on the type of issuers: equity warrants and covered warrants. Equity warrants are issued by the issuers of the underlying stocks (usually the listed companies), whereas covered warrants are issued by an independent third party (usually financial institutions such as investment banks). The detailed differences between equity warrants and covered warrants are listed in Table 1 .
Overview of the Chinese warrant market
Warrants were launched in the mainland China financial market as early as the 1990s, not long after China established the stock market. The Da Feile warrant, the first of its kind, was issued in Shanghai in June 1992. During the 1990s, there were 14 warrants in total in the Chinese market. However, the issuance of warrants was abolished later by the regulator due to rampant speculation and market manipulation. The reintroduction and development of Chinese warrant market in 2005 was a result of the split share structure reform of listed companies. For example, Baoshan Iron & Steel Co. was the first company to issue the warrants as part of a plan to compensate its investors for allowing the companies' non-tradable shares to be listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange. More specifically, for every 10 shares held, minority shareholders were given 2.2 bonus shares and one warrant giving them the option to buy one share for 4.5 yuan, or about 56 U.S. cents, within a specified time.
Currently all stock trades in the Chinese financial market are settled on the next business day following a transaction, which is called "T+1". Only warrants trades are allowed to be settled on the same day of a transaction, and is called "T+0". Allowing investors to buy and sell securities on the same day (intraday trading) provides investors with greater flexibility to take advantage of short-term swings in security prices. Due to the scarcity of "T+0" investment instruments, combined with other reasons such as transaction cost and price change limits, Baosteel warrants and all the other subsequent warrants soon became one of the favorite products of Chinese investors.
Until March 14, 2008 (the end of our sample period), 47 warrants have been traded in either the Shanghai or the Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. Among these warrants, 30 were expired, and 17 were still being traded at that point in time. These 47 warrants contain 28 covered warrants and 19 equity warrants. The detailed information for each warrant is listed in the Appendix.
The warrant creation mechanism in the Chinese warrant market
In developed markets like Hong Kong or Germany, all of the standard warrant products adopt the mechanism of "continuous creation" which allows issuers or other qualified institutions to add to the supply of warrants at any time. When launching the second (Wuhan Steel call 580001) and the third (Wuhan Steel put 580999) warrants, Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) released the "Notice of Relevant Issues concerning Securities Companies' Creation of Wuhan Steel Warrants", which stated that the securities companies with the innovation pilot qualification of the Securities Association of China are eligible to create new warrants. The warrant creation mechanism has been in place since then. This creation mechanism means that after a warrant is issued in the split share structure reform of listed companies, qualified securities companies (creators) may create warrants with the same specification as the original ones traded in the market. The creation involves writing a new contract and selling it to the market, which increases the supply and stabilizes the price. The creators may cancel the warrant by repurchasing it from the market. For the cancellation, the creator who applies to cancel warrants, upon approval of the SSE, and after buying back a certain amount of warrants, should notify the Shanghai Branch of China Securities Depository and Clearing Corporation Limited (CSDC) to cancel the warrants on the very day and unfreeze the corresponding shares or capital on the next day.
Warrant prices in the Chinese market are usually much higher than their theoretical values.
This was especially so in the two-year bull market (2006 and 2007) . Even a deeply out-of-the-money put could still have a high price. It brings to those securities companies, who are qualified to create warrants, opportunities to make huge profits from the creation of warrants.
So far only those securities companies with innovation pilot qualification awarded by the Securities Association of China are qualified to create warrants, and domestic investors call these companies "innovative securities companies" (innovation pilot securities dealers). In this situation, even if the market price of warrants is abnormally high, only these "innovative securities companies" may earn abnormal profit from taking short positions.
III Data
In this section, we introduce the data. The dataset employed in this study is from Wind Info, a leading financial data provider in Mainland China. We use all of the 30 warrants that expired In the Chinese warrant market, some warrants, especially put warrants, are traded so actively that their trading is forced to be suspended by the exchanges for several hours on certain days, while the underlying stocks are still traded during this period. Due to the time inconsistency in intraday data between the warrants and their underlying stocks, we use daily data.
3.1. Summary statistics of the Chinese warrant market Table 2 shows the average daily trading volume/value of all the 30 expired warrants and their underlying stocks during the lifetime of the warrants, the average daily price/time value (market and Black-Scholes), and the daily average volatility in addition. We find that for all of the warrants, except Wanhua HXB1 (580005), the average daily trading volume/value of the warrants is significantly higher than that of their underlying stocks. In some cases, such as Hansteel JTB1 (580003), it can be ten times higher. Market price and time value computed from market price are generally much higher systematically than the Black-Scholes ones. Implied volatility is also significantly higher than historical volatility at 1% level. Figure 1a shows the market prices and Black-Scholes prices with historical volatility of the "typical" warrant, Baosteel JTB1 (580000). The historical volatility on any date is computed as the standard deviation of log stock price returns in a moving window of fixed length. The length of the moving window is determined as the time to expiration of the warrant at its initial trading date. From Figure 1a , we observe that the market prices of warrants are generally much higher than their Black-Scholes prices. This phenomenon is significant for four put warrants: Zhaohang CMP1 (580997), Hualing JTP1 (038003), Zhongji ZYP1 (038006) and Jiafei JTP1 (038008).
A comparison between the market price and the Black-Scholes price
During the period between the end of May 2007 ("5.30 market crash" 1 ) and the beginning of July 2007, as short-term deeply out-of-the-money puts, the values of these four warrants were supposed to be zero. However, their market prices were unreasonably high. In this situation, the "innovative securities companies" (innovation pilot securities dealers), who are qualified to create warrants, made huge arbitrage profit by creating and selling these deeply out-of-the-money put warrants to the market. Figure 1b shows a comparison between the daily trading value of the warrants and that of their underlying stocks. We find that the daily trading value of the warrants is consistently higher than that of their underlying stocks. We offer the following explanations: (1) In order to take advantage of short-term swings of the asset price, domestic investors prefer products that have "T+0" mechanism which mentioned in section II. This motivates investors to trade warrants actively. According to a statistics by the Shanghai Stock Exchange, 80% of the warrant trading volume was induced by the "T+0" mechanism. (2) (580997) as an example of the four put warrants mentioned above. They were heavily over-priced a few months before the maturity dates. It is interesting to observe that their market prices are highly correlated with their trading values. This phenomenon indicates that the over-pricing of the four put warrants was driven by the frenetic speculation in the market. We will come back to this point when presenting our regression results of delta-hedged gains.
A comparison between time values computed from the market price and that from the

Black-Scholes price
For those deeply in-the-money call warrants, such as Wanhua HXB1 (580005) for put, where is the underlying stock price, S K is the strike price, is the risk-free rate, and is the time to maturity. In order to observe the difference between market and Black-Scholes prices more clearly, we should study their time values. The time value of a warrant is defined as the difference between its market (Black-Scholes) price and its intrinsic r τ value. Figure 3a shows the time values computed from the market and Black-Scholes prices of the "typical" warrant, Zhonghua CWB1 (580011). We observe that the time value of call warrants computed from market price is higher than that computed from the Black-Scholes price.
Sometimes certain call warrants have negative time values, which indicates that they are underpriced at this moment. The time value of put warrants computed from market price is usually much higher than that computed from the Black-Scholes price.
A comparison between implied volatility and historical volatility
To further quantify the misprice of a warrant, we compare its implied volatility with its historical volatility. Figure 3b shows a comparison between implied volatilities and historical volatilities of the "typical" warrant, Zhonghua CWB1 (580011). For some warrants, such as Yili CWB1 (580009) and Zhonghua CWB1 (580011), the implied volatility cannot be computed on certain dates due to the fact that their market prices are lower than their intrinsic values on these days.
From Figure 3b , we observe that the implied volatility of call warrants is around 100%-300%, which is much higher than historical volatility (around 40%). The implied volatility of put warrants is even higher, up to 1000%, increasing dramatically as the maturity date approaches. This is because the deeply out-of-the-money put warrants were still traded with a certain price a couple days before the maturity dates.
IV Empirical Results
In this section, we empirically examine violations of market observations to the predictions of one-dimensional diffusion models, compute the excess gain of a delta-hedged warrant, and explore the hidden factors that drive the dynamics of the gain. A delta-hedged portfolio is: (1) a long call position, hedged by a short position in the underlying stock, or (2) a long put position, hedged by a long position in the underlying stock, with the net investment earning the risk-free rate. The methodologies used mainly follow that of Bakshi, Cao and Chen (2000), and Bakshi and Kapadia (2003a).
Before presenting empirical results, we first review the one-dimensional model and its
properties. Assume that the price of underlying asset, , follows a one-dimensional diffusion process as follows (for simplicity, here we assume that underlying assets do not pay dividend):
where the drift μ and the volatility σ are deterministic functions of t S nd t, t B a standard Brownian motion. All the option pricing models, which are built on the underlying prices with one-dimensional diffusion process, must have the following three properties: the monotonicity property,
the perfect correlation property and the option redundancy property. The proof of the monotonicity property is provided by Bergman, Grundy, and Wiener (1996) . They show that if the underlying asset price process is a one-dimensional diffusion process, as well as in certain restricted stochastic volatility models, the option's Delta is bounded by the infimum and supremum of its Delta at maturity, which means 0 C S
Moreover, if the option's payoff is convex (concave), the option's price is a convex (concave) function of the underlying asset's price. The perfect correlation property is determined by the sole source of stochastic variation for all options in a one-dimensional diffusion model. For the option redundancy property, we know that an option can always be exactly dynamically replicated by the underlying asset and a risk-free bond. The excess gain of a delta-hedged option is zero.
In order to facilitate our understanding of the nature of the excess gain generated by a delta-hedged option, now we present a generic two-factor model. Assuming the underlying asset follows the same diffusion process in equation (1) 
A delta-hedged portfolio is defined as , where
. The excess gain of the delta-hedged portfolio is 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 2
The risk in the portfolio depends only on the risk in the process of . For example, investor trade volatility risk as noted by Bakshi and Kapadia (2003a) . The cumulated gain from to , denoted by is given by
If there is only one factor ( in stock price process) traded in the derivatives market, then must be zero. Moreover, if is significantly nonzero, we may conclude that there is at least one more additional risk factor traded in this market. In section 4.3, we will use the discrete form of equation (4) to compute the delta-hedged gains. 
Type III violation: 0, but 0 ; 0, but 0 . Table 3 presents empirical results on testing the monotonicity property. It shows the occurrence rates of four different violations for the 30 expired warrants in Chinese warrant market.
The results of S&P 500 options by Bakshi, Cao and Chen (2000) are included as a benchmark in the last line of each table. From Table 3 , we observe that the total occurrence rate of the four types of violations in the Chinese warrant market is higher than 50% for most of the warrants, sometimes even higher than 70%, which is much higher than those in the U.S. market (21.4% and 24.2%). Through the trading in the past two and half years, the violation rates of call warrants are decreasing significantly. For example, the total frequency of violations of the call warrant, Zhonghua CWB1 (580011) Compared with the warrants issued in 2005 or expired in 2006, whose total rates of violations are about 60% to 70%, the violation rates of those newly-expired call warrants are decreasing significantly. However, the total violation rates of put warrants still remain at a level higher than 50%, and there is no evidence to show that they are going to decrease.
Another interesting phenomenon is that, for call warrants, type IV violation is more likely to occur than type I violation, which means that call warrant prices are more likely to overreact to the price changes of their underlying stocks. Whereas for put warrants, type I violation happens much more frequently than type IV violation, which means put warrant prices are more likely to move in the wrong direction when the underlying stock prices changes. For type III violation, its occurrence rate in the U.S. is zero, whereas it is significantly above zero in the Chinese warrant market. We believe that it is caused by market microstructure, because the minimum tick size in the Chinese warrant market is 0.1 cent, but the minimum tick size in the stock market is 1 cent.
Therefore it appears that warrant prices might change even though the underlying stock prices do not. We may conclude from Table 3 that the warrant prices in the Chinese warrant market do not support the monotonicity property of the one-dimensional diffusion models.
Testing the perfect correlation property
We compute the correlation matrix between the four assets: market warrant prices, Black-Scholes warrant prices, underlying stock prices and Shanghai Composite Index. We compute the correlation coefficients by using the time series of daily price changes of a warrant and its underlying asset. As a robustness test, we compute the correlation by using the Black-Scholes prices, which is supposed to be 1 for calls and -1 for puts. Table 4 shows the correlation matrix of calls and puts separately. We see that the correlation between price changes of warrant and that of the underlying stock is not as high as 1 for calls and -1 for puts, different from the requirements of one-dimensional diffusion models. Especially for put warrants, the correlations are close to zero, which indicates that investors are trading put warrants as independent assets instead of derivatives of their underlying stocks. However, after two and half years of trading, the correlation between price changes of call warrants and those of underlying stocks increases significantly. For example, for Yager QCB1 (580006) traded on the Shanghai Stock Exchange, the correlation coefficient between price changes of the warrant and that of its underlying stock is 0.91. Another example is Qiaocheng HQC1 (031001) traded on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. The correlation coefficient between price changes of the warrant and that of its underlying stock is 0.91. However, there is no evidence that the correlation coefficients of the put warrants approach -1. Our result on the correlation between price changes from the Black-Scholes formula and that of the underlying stocks is almost 1 for most of the calls. This indicates that our calculation is reliable. These results mean that the put warrants prices in the Chinese warrant market do not support the perfect correlation property of one-dimensional diffusion models. Their correlations with the underlying stocks are almost zero. Investors are trading put warrants as independent assets instead of derivatives of their underlying stocks.
Testing the option redundancy property
The cumulated delta-hedged gains defined in equation (4) can be written in a discrete form as follows Table 5 reports the sign and the magnitude of cumulated delta-hedged gains for all the 30 expired warrants. Column four of the table shows the cash amount of the gains, .
Columns five and six present the relative amount of the gains, normalized by the initial ( , ) t t π τ + underlying stock price and warrant price , in order to make the cumulated delta-hedged gains comparable across the time-series and the cross-section. The last column reports the occurrence frequency of negative delta-hedged gains over the lifetime of the warrants. Table 5 , the delta-hedging strategies lose money for 90% (27 out of 30) of the warrants with an average loss of CNY -1.09. "The money left on the table" equals 14.11% of the underlying asset value on average, or 46.48% of the warrant price itself. In the U.S. market, for all firms, on average, the delta-hedging strategy loses 0.03% of the underlying asset value, and the same delta-hedging strategy for the index option has a loss of 0.07% of the underlying index level (Bakshi and Kapadia (2003b)). For call warrants, the delta-hedging strategy loses 16.75% of the underlying asset value, or 45.70% of the warrant value. For put warrants, the strategy loses 11.79% of the underlying asset value, or 47.17% of the warrant value. The occurrence frequency of negative delta-hedged gains is higher than 50% for both call and put warrants. Our results remain robust when the median is taken as the measure of central tendency. The amount of negative delta-hedged gains in the Chinese warrant market is much larger than that in the U.S.
market, because only a small portion of institutions (innovation pilot securities dealers) could take short position of warrants in China. They can take "the money left on the table" away by constructing the opposite position as the delta-hedging strategy. Since the cumulated delta-hedged gain is significantly nonzero, we may conclude that the warrants are not redundant assets in the Chinese warrant market. We explore the additional risk factors traded in the warrant market in the following.
The additional risk factors traded in the warrant market: what drives the delta-hedged gains?
We try to identify the sources of the delta-hedged gains by using OLS regressions on the time series of the gains against the 11 possible explanatory variables. The explanatory variables include: index return, index volatility, index trading volume, underlying stock return, underlying stock volatility with the two measures, underlying stock trading volume and trading value, warrant trading volume and trading value. In particular, the daily volatility is calculated by using where GAINS is the daily gains of delta-hedged warrants; IdxRt is market index return; IdxVol is daily market index volatility; SVol is daily underlying stock volatility; TrdValue is warrant trading value. Table 6 provides the results of the panel regressions. We observe that the coefficients of IdxVol and SVol are significant at 5% level both for calls and puts, which means that the volatility risk is one of the main sources in the delta-hedged gains. The coefficients of market risk (IdxRt) are significant at 5% level for calls and the coefficients of TrdValue are significant at 10% level for puts, which means that investors are also trading some other risks in the Chinese warrant market in addition to the underlying risks.
Recently, Bakshi, Madan and Panayotov (2010) propose a theory of U-shaped pricing kernel for equity. Based on this theory, they have a testable implication for call options: higher the strike, lower the return of out-of-the-money (OTM) calls. The return of OTM calls could be negative if strike is higher than a certain threshold. The empirical observations from S&P 500 index options and international equity options markets support their theory. Because in Chinese warrant market, we only have one strike and one maturity (usually one year), it is not possible to perform a similar test.
V Conclusions
In this paper, we study the newly-developed Chinese warrant market by using the data of all The warrants are much over-priced compared with the Black-Scholes prices with historical volatility, sometimes more than twice. The implied volatility of the warrants is very high, sometimes 100% for calls, and even 1000% for puts, especially for those short-term deeply out-of-the-money put warrants.
Arbitrage can be achieved if investors are allowed to sell the warrants to the market. In fact, some institutions (innovation pilot securities dealers), with permissions from the regulators to create warrants, are making huge arbitrage profit by creating and selling warrants. Investors lack the basic knowledge of warrants, such as their intrinsic value, the zero value of deeply out-of-the-money put.
One-dimensional diffusion models, including the Black-Scholes model, do not apply in the Chinese warrant market. The investors are trading some other risk factors in the Chinese warrant market, in addition to the underlying risk.
The cumulated delta-hedged gains in the Chinese warrant market are significantly negative.
The negative gains are mainly driven by volatility risk, and the trading value of the warrants (for puts), and the market risk (for calls). When equity warrants are exercised, the listed company must issue new shares and sell them at strike price to the warrants holder (take call warrants as an example).
The total number of outstanding shares is increased after exercise of the warrants.
There is a dilution effect.
When covered warrants are exercised, if it is stock settlement, the warrants issuer just sell stocks to warrants holder, if it is cash settlement, the warrants issuer just pay the difference between strike price and the underlying asset price in cash to the warrants holder.
The number of outstanding shares will not be changed.
There is no dilution effect.
Underlying assets Single stock Single stock, or portfolio of stocks, or index Time to expiration usually 1 to 5 years usually 6 months to 2 years Settlement deliver stocks deliver stocks, or settled by cash Historical Volatility Implied Volatility Appendix: Overview of the Chinese warrant market. Up until March 14, 2008 , there were totally 47 warrants traded on the Shanghai and Shenzhen markets. Among these warrants, 30 were expired and 17 were still being traded at that point in time. This table shows, for each of the 47 warrants, its trading code (ticker), name, underlying stock code (ticker), underlying stock name, exchanges (in column 6, with header "Ex", where "SH" stands for Shanghai Stock Exchange, and "SZ" for Shenzhen Stock Exchange), categories (in column 7, with header "C/P", where "C" stands for call and "P" for put; in column 8, with header "A/B/E", where "A" stands for American, "E" for European, and "B" for Bermuda; in column 9, with header "Covered/Equity", meaning covered warrant or equity warrant), maturity (including the start day for trading and end day for exercise; column 12, with header "TTM (days)", which stands for days to maturity at the initial issuance time; column 13, with header "Exp Y/N", which means whether the warrant was expired or not up until 
